ទំនាក់ទំនងរវាងសហរដ្ឋអាមេរិក និងចិន ដូចដែលបានឃើញតាមរយៈឯកសារសន្តិសុខឆ្នាំ ២០២៥

 China describes pressure from the U.S. as the greatest challenge to China's peaceful development, while the U.S. describes China as a comprehensive, systemic, and long-term challenge.

The simultaneous release of two important documents— the U.S. National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025) and China’s National Security in the New Era —marked a fundamental shift in how the two superpowers perceive the strategic environment, define long-term goals, and shape how they will interact with each other in the future. Notably, both documents were released at a time when the U.S.-China competition had moved beyond a reactive, improvisational phase to a more stable, structural phase. The directions set out in these two security strategy documents released in 2025 provide the theoretical and practical foundation for forecasting the trajectory of bilateral relations in 2026 and beyond. From this, a comprehensive, multi-layered picture of competition emerges, but one that also contains certain areas for limited, conditional cooperation.

A striking similarity is that both portray the other as a direct source of strategic risk. China describes pressure from the U.S. as the greatest challenge to China’s peaceful development, while the U.S. describes China as a comprehensive, systemic, and long-term challenge.

Furthermore, the two countries’ perceptions of the structure of the international order also show a convergence. The US continues to see itself as a pillar of the rules-based order formed after the Cold War, focusing on freedom of navigation, economic transparency, security alliances, and global governance standards. The NSS 2025 affirms that the US must protect a fair, open, and stable international order against powers seeking to reshape it to their advantage. China, describing the world as being in a period of unprecedented upheaval, emphasizes the need to reform the global governance system to reflect the changing balance of power. This reveals a fundamental asymmetry in the definition of legitimacy of the rules-based international order championed by the US, and confirms that the competition between the two sides is not a temporary disagreement but a long-term confrontation over systemic visions. In this context, strategic alignment between the US and China will likely remain minimal, primarily aimed at avoiding conflict and managing crises.

However, the differences in behavioral logic are clear. Each side believes it is acting to protect stability, but the incompatibility in perception makes one side’s stability a threat to the other. The NSS 2025 emphasizes the need to strengthen forward presence in the Indo-Pacific region, reinforcing key alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, while expanding security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. The document also describes the QUAD with India as a pillar of the regional security architecture. On the other side, China clearly demonstrates its commitment to comprehensive defense modernization, enhancing its naval, air, and missile capabilities to maintain effective defense against any external interference. The emphasis on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities shows that the PLA continues to prioritize preventing a US military presence in hotspots near China. These two approaches create a “cold exterior, hot interior” confrontation structure, where both sides want to avoid war but are unwilling to compromise. This is also why hotspots like the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait always carry the risk of military clashes.

Regarding the Taiwan issue – in the NSS 2025, the US strongly opposes any unilateral actions aimed at changing the status quo, while reaffirming its commitment to supporting Taiwan’s defense capabilities in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. This wording maintains a strategically ambiguous stance but simultaneously increases deterrence as Washington emphasizes building an asymmetrical defense capability for Taipei. Conversely, China’s Security White Paper strongly refutes the Western position that Taiwan’s status is undetermined, asserting that unification is its greatest core interest and an uncrossable red line.

Trade, technology, and supply chains are equally structurally crucial axes of competition. The National Supply Chain Strategy (NSS) 2025 identifies “reducing strategic dependence” on China in the semiconductor, clean energy, battery, rare earth, pharmaceutical, and digital technology sectors. The US advocates building a “resilient supply chain,” prioritizing cooperation with reliable partners and expanding export control policies. China responds with a strategy of “technological self-reliance” and “domestic circulation as the cornerstone, combined with expanded external circulation,” aiming to reduce dependence on the West for core technologies. These two parallel trends lead to the gradual formation of two separate economic and technological ecosystems, with different rules, value chains, and technical standards. In this context, competition is not just a market issue but becomes a matter of national security. In 2026, the technology sector is expected to be one of the hottest spots, with the potential for further measures to control chips, AI, quantum technology, as well as retaliatory actions from China.

Another less overtly expressed but fairly clearly mentioned axis of competition is the area of non-traditional security, particularly cyberspace and outer space. The U.S. views China as its primary rival in cyber intrusion campaigns, intellectual property theft, and information influence, and is increasing investment in satellite systems, space technology, and missile defense. China, meanwhile, warns of “threats from cyberspace and outer space posed by certain nations seeking to maintain monopolistic dominance,” implicitly targeting the U.S. and its allies. This indicates that U.S.-China competition has expanded from the ground to digital and outer space, areas where international law is still incomplete, increasing the risk of misunderstandings. 2026 is likely to see an acceleration in the race for satellites, navigation systems, and the militarization of space technology.

Looking at the overall picture of the aforementioned competitive axes, US-China relations in the coming period will continue to follow the trajectory of “competitive control – minimal cooperation – dialogue to avoid risks.” This is a model where competition is the default state, cooperation only appears in essential areas such as climate change, pandemic control, or global financial stability, and dialogue is only aimed at crisis management, not at building trust. A positive point is that both documents recognize that direct conflict would cause unacceptable losses. Therefore, despite increased deterrence, it is likely that both sides will maintain military and diplomatic communication channels to minimize miscalculations.

2026 is projected to be a year of continued expansion of US-China competition. Pressure in the technology sector will intensify, as both sides view it as the foundation of their power dominance. The Indo-Pacific region will continue to be a key battleground, with the potential for military activity in Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. Global supply chains will continue to decouple, forcing middle-sized nations to adjust their strategies. The level of competition in non-traditional security areas will increase significantly. Overall, the trajectory of bilateral relations is unlikely to see a positive breakthrough unless geopolitical shocks force deeper cooperation between the two sides.

Nevertheless, competition does not necessarily mean conflict, and both Washington and Beijing have an incentive to maintain relative stability to ensure growth and avoid crises. This creates narrow spaces for conditional cooperation. However, overall, competition will permeate all areas, from economics and technology to security. The two security documents are therefore not only products of the current strategic context, but also provide foundational data for better understanding how the world’s two largest powers will shape the international order in the next decade—an order characterized by regional separation, multi-centeredness, and more layers of power than the traditional unipolar or bipolar model.

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