អាវុធស្វយ័ត៖ បង្កើតសង្រ្គាមឡើងវិញ កំណត់សន្តិភាពឡើងវិញ?

 

As the world continues to witness the formidable rise of Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS), these disruptive warfare models are poised to reshape security strategies, regional dynamics, and warfare mechanics. This shift has altered the landscape of global security and heightened tensions in various regions. The debate about whether AWS will be a boon or a bane for global security and deterrence practices is yet to be settled. With conflicts displaying a dramatic entrance of sophisticated drones and other manoeuverable warfare tactics, conventional thresholds and war casualties remain optimally low with controlled escalation and strategic restraints.

However, the rapid acquisition of autonomous weapons, particularly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and the formation of regional alliances around these “wonder weapons” are also triggering major insecurities. States with traditional defences and outdated military strategies feel vulnerable. The potential risks associated with non-state entities in securing such innovative weapons have made the world realise the strategic and political cost of domestic selling of such flexible, dangerous, and versatile equipment. The ongoing disparity between offensive weaponry and defensive shields provides a valuable lesson for states facing the challenges posed by AWS and the increasing prevalence of drone warfare. Such operational vulnerabilities, coupled with the procurement of smart weapons by non-military industrial complexes, create an urgent need for states to acquire both offensive and defensive tools. This is crucial for geostrategic powers to avoid regional imbalances, deterrence failures, terrorist threats, and obsolete war doctrines.

Precision warfare models offer swift victories, lower reactive patterns, and achieve war aims without eroding deterrence or encroaching on conventional thresholds.

The inflection point that triggered this dramatic rise in procuring such hardware is often traced back to the Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan, even though the Bush Administration notably used aerial drones in the Invasion of Iraq. While AWS can facilitate more limited conflicts, preventing large-scale invasions from taking centre stage, the escalation ladder still struggles to adjust to such disruptive technologies. With global security and strategic deterrence lingering on traditional escalation patterns, technological determinism appears to signal a paradigm shift, driving the world rapidly to the “3rd Nuclear Age.”

These “wonder weapons of the 21st century,” from the Russia-Ukraine War to the Iran-Israel conflict, have revolutionised large-scale wars and polished limited conventional conflicts. The use of loitering munitions with swarm tactics, electronic warfare (EW), lasers, and hypersonic weapons, apart from cruise or ballistic missiles, has fundamentally changed warfighting. This provides a sophisticated yet complacent scorecard for geopolitical offensives. For instance, even if Ukraine lacks a conventional naval fleet of its own, the use of Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and kamikaze drones has done substantial damage to Russian naval fleets, providing a psychological upgrade to Kyiv’s scorecard, while displaying the potential innovative technology has over expensive naval fleets.

Although the rise of AWS risks fracturing deterrence theories, strategic stability, and nuclear thresholds, their stealth, precision, and political deniability make them more than just a war instrument. How they blur the lines between conventional and strategic attacks, hamper the interoperability of military operations, and create a heightened paranoia, or adeptly test the red lines of the adversary, all move strategic conflicts to a grey zone warfare. These continuous technological upgrades, coupled with shifts in global diplomacy and coercive tactics, have transformed conflict thresholds from tactical to psychological. The power of threat by surprise, fear, and strategic denial now holds significant sway. This shift has prompted regional powers to realise that defensive doctrines, offensive capabilities, and strategic calculations should conform to international conflict trends.

The widespread integration of aerial drones into new zones of tension worldwide forces crisis managers and analysts to definitively answer the “bane versus boon” question for global security. The case of South Asia is particularly insightful. Drones used by India in past skirmishes helped lower the probability of wider crisis escalation, psychologically unsettling Pakistan’s defensive systems. Pakistan, in turn, employed its own drone capabilities in a similar fashion. This demonstrated how disruptive technology can limit crisis escalation and achieve strategic needs through simple, adaptive, and precision strikes. With strategic stability between two nuclear adversaries hanging on a regional tightrope, innovative warfighting doctrines limited escalation and allowed both sides to measure strategic advancements, averting any nuclear or strategic stand-off with unimaginable proportions. This highlights the “mending” aspect of drones in specific contexts.

It’s tempting to believe that seeking short-term strategic or tactical wins against adversaries with calculated drone attacks will fracture global security. However, this view might overlook the argument that such precision warfare models offer swift victories, lower reactive patterns, and achieve war aims without eroding deterrence or encroaching on conventional thresholds. With desperate attempts of compellence to provoke adversaries, these precision warfare tactics with state-of-the-art upgradations for military reconnaissance, combat, and situational readiness, become powerful psychological tools. The world is scrambling to counter this manoeuvrability. Expensive, modernised defensive systems often fail to adequately detect, defeat, and dismantle First-Person-View (FPV) drones and other adaptive hardware. These bypass traditional defences and security protocols, aiding in attritional warfare to sustain ground control. The recent extensive use of drones by the Russian military in Ukraine has raised serious concerns about the asymmetries, algorithms, and operational capabilities of drone swarming to overwhelm and psychologically crush any state’s defensive shields.

The rampage of attrition warfare, combined with diplomatic stalemates, continues to threaten the global security apparatus. Russia’s military actions, for instance, create an existential crisis for its neighbouring Baltic states. Any attempt by Russia to employ a similar coercive model on other Baltic states, particularly Lithuania, would undoubtedly trigger a disruptive response from NATO allies. However, the possibility of a lower-level conflict, leveraging the political mileage already gained by UAVs, could offer Russia a way to gauge the future response of member states. Estimating the war cost, diplomatic expense, and national toll is crucial, as Russia cannot afford another complex front while Ukraine remains a geopolitical challenge, with AWS impacting both sides.

As conflicts evolve into different frontiers of attritional dynamics, the coercion of erasing the nuclear taboo and strategic signalling has somewhat subsided. AWS creates an asymmetrical dilemma where unprecedented, surprising or lethal attacks from both sides now contribute to a form of “prestige politics.” In recent times, shifts in conflict exercises, traditional border clashes, and even large-scale confrontations have shown a sharp decline in the possibilities of an all-out war, provided strategic goals meet national requirements.

The potential fracturing or gradual fragmentation of global security appears to be finding a precarious balance, with states acquiring multispectral sensors, lasers, drone jammers, anti-satellite weapons, thermal detectors, and cyberweapons. This continuous advancement, with states recalibrating global trends and adapting to threats by denial, will likely continue to shape and, perhaps, ultimately mend the global security apparatus.

CSCR