នៅក្នុងការបដិសេធ?
Debating U.S. Nuclear Strategy
As the world has become more multipolar over the last 75 years, so, too, have the nuclear threats to the United States. Today, China, North Korea, and Russia point their missiles, armed with thermonuclear warheads, at the American homeland. The task of extending nuclear deterrence to allies has also become more complicated for Washington. Those allies, including Japan and South Korea, are concerned that U.S. credibility is not what it once was and are now considering acquiring nuclear arsenals of their own.
In their article “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age” (July/August 2025), Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi conclude that to deal with this new landscape, Washington “needs a more flexible and robust arsenal not to fight a nuclear war but to prevent its outbreak.” Their argument is undergirded by a pessimistic assessment of the likelihood of successfully pursuing “arms control and nuclear risk reduction efforts.” Given the authors’ understanding of the purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, their judgment is unsurprising.
Narang and Vaddi argue that U.S. nuclear strategy has three parts: “to survive a first strike and impose assured destruction on its attacker”; to “limit the amount of damage the attacker can inflict on the United States and its allies” by maintaining “the capability to destroy as many of the attacker’s nuclear weapons as practicable before or after they are launched”; and to “retain sufficient nuclear capabilities after an initial exchange to deter further attack.”
One is left to wonder how the pursuit of all the “counterforce” capability required of the second part of the strategy—an extraordinary characterization of the traditional goal of “damage limitation” laid out in past U.S. nuclear posture reviews—can be distinguished from the pursuit of a disarming, preemptive, “first strike” capability. Is the purpose of the United States’ nuclear arsenal to deny the country’s adversaries deterrence of their own? Would not acceptance of the authors’ criteria for a proper nuclear strategy guarantee an arms race?
Narang and Vaddi correctly recognize the potentially destabilizing impact of the Trump administration’s proposed Golden Dome missile defense. But they assign no responsibility for the increased threat posed by China’s and Russia’s diversified strategic nuclear arsenals to the United States, which, by withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and its subsequent pursuit of a homeland ballistic missile defense capability, threatened the ability of Beijing and Moscow to deter a U.S. preemptive first strike.
It is certainly reasonable to reconsider the size, shape, and purpose of the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons arsenal as the character and magnitude of the threat from adversaries evolves and grows. But any reevaluation must take into account adversaries’ likely reactions to it. Washington should not expect to achieve its security objectives by attempting to prevent adversaries from seeking security through a deterrent strategy similar to its own. If it does, it should expect a dangerous, never-ending arms race.
ROBERT L. GALLUCCI is Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
Narang and Vaddi Reply
We agree with Robert Gallucci that the risk of a nuclear arms race must be considered when presidents make decisions regarding nuclear strategy, policy, posture, and capabilities. But it is not the United States that is drastically expanding its nuclear arsenal or introducing new and destabilizing capabilities; China and Russia are doing so. Both continue to enhance their strategic and nonstrategic arsenals, with China developing fractional orbital bombardment systems—weapons placed in low-earth orbit to elude missile defenses—and Russia seeking nuclear-powered cruise missiles and nuclear-armed antisatellite weapons, among other capabilities. All these present new deterrence challenges that demand a new approach from the United States. Business as usual will threaten American national security.
Moreover, preserving the imperative of damage limitation—a core component of U.S. nuclear strategy for almost three-quarters of a century—does not require the United States to mirror either China’s or Russia’s approach. We propose modest adjustments that are consistent with decades of U.S. nuclear thinking and that do not expand the U.S. stockpile. We do so as we prioritize stable deterrence and reducing the risk that a nuclear weapon will be employed by any actor. Arms races do not by themselves increase the risk of deterrence failure; unchecked asymmetries in arms competition do.
Finally, we note that nuclear deterrence cannot be managed solely by changes to U.S. nuclear posture. Arms control policy will remain essential, and serious U.S. nuclear strategists should support diplomatic measures that promote stable deterrence. U.S. administrations must create incentives for adversaries to engage in nuclear diplomacy. But at the moment, it is China and Russia that are unwilling to enter those discussions, not the United States.
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