តើការផ្លាស់ប្តូរព្រំដែនអាចជារឿងល្អទេ?
A redrawing of maps in Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere might serve U.S. interests.
It has been a busy six weeks in international relations. Since early December, there has been a case of attempted secession, the recognition of a previously unrecognized breakaway territory of a state, military action to prevent the potential fragmentation of another state, and the threat by one country to shear off the self-governing territory of another country through intimidation.
Let’s leave aside the Trump administration’s apparent effort to wrest control of Greenland. Yemen’s aborted southern secession, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, and Ahmed al-Sharaa’s use of force to prevent Syria’s fracture all raise an important question for U.S. policymakers. Should the borders that we have come to know in the post-World War II/post-Cold War worlds be considered sacrosanct? Judging by the response to each of these episodes from the international community, the answer is yes. But with the “rupture” in the global order, it is worth considering whether this should always be the case.
In fact, the recent record suggests that policymakers should, under certain circumstances, relax their seemingly axiomatic opposition to secession. “It depends” is hardly a bold policy statement, but there are going to be times during the current interregnum between one global order and the next one when it will make sense to accept the emergence of new states. No doubt, this sets up a host of thorny moral questions, but no one ever said that foreign policy was easy.
For example, should there be one or two Yemens? In early December, forces under the command of Aidarous al-Zubaidi—who at the time served as both the vice president of Yemen’s collective Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and the president of the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—seized control of the entire southern portion of the country. This power move set the stage for Zubaidi and his forces to declare the south’s independence, dealing simultaneous blows to Ansar Allah—aka the Houthis, which control the capital, Sanaa, and the northwestern part of the country—and the Saudis, who had put time, effort, and resources into supporting the PLC.
The Saudis were having none of this. Over the course of the following month, they marshaled their allies in Yemen, who regained lost territory and reportedly pushed Zubaidi out of the country (though no one knows where he currently is). The STC was dissolved in early January in an announcement from Riyadh, though large demonstrations in Aden since then suggest that southern independence remains a live issue.
Given U.S. interests in the region, it should be self-evident why a second Yemen might be good for Washington. With secure borders, the existence of South Yemen would make it harder for Tehran to smuggle weapons and supplies to the Houthis. In addition, the military and political pressure that a South Yemen would exert on the Houthis would stretch the group’s resources, forcing it to focus its attention at home rather than, say, hitting Tel Aviv and/or Eilat. Speaking of Israel, it seems likely that southern Yemeni leaders, who enjoy close ties with the United Arab Emirates, would normalize ties with Israel. Taken together, developments would make it harder for the Houthis to harass Red Sea shipping at will—a net plus for Egypt, which relies on Suez Canal tolls; Europe; and commercial shipping lines whose costs have increased because of Houthi aggression.
Add it all up, and it is hard not to conclude that South Yemen’s independence would likely make the Arabian Peninsula more stable. It is easy to be overly optimistic about the benefits of a newly independent country in Yemen’s south, but it is not like unified Yemen has been a beacon of stability and prosperity. Supporting the formation of a South Yemen—or at least not standing in the way—would be worth the risk.
At around the same time that the Saudis and their Yemeni partners were putting down Zubaidi’s coup, Israel recognized Somaliland. The territory on the Gulf of Aden is home to 6 million people and slightly larger than Florida. It’s part of the Federal Republic of Somalia but declared itself independent in 1991. It has its own government, security forces, and regularly scheduled elections. Freedom House rates it as “partly free,” which is better than Somalia’s “not free.” Israel’s move angered Arab countries, the African Union, and Turkey, and it garnered a vapid statement from the European Union that “reaffirms the importance of respecting the unity, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”
In Washington, President Donald Trump’s White House was mute, and members of Congress were either supportive or uncharacteristically quiet about something the Israelis had done. That’s likely because Somalia has been a source of instability in the Horn of Africa for decades. Also, looked at purely through the prism of U.S. interests, Somaliland’s independence is good for the United States—though, let’s not get carried away; it is hardly decisive. The United States could secure its interests in the region without Somaliland, but like an independent South Yemen, it would be a partner that would help put pressure on Houthis and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and provide another vantage point from which to keep an eye on the Chinese, who have a base in neighboring Djibouti—as does the United States.
The Trump administration remains committed to Somalia’s unity in large part because other important U.S. partners are opposed to Hargeisa’s independence and committed to Mogadishu. Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have invested with the central government in mining, agriculture, and infrastructure projects and have also provided Somalia with security assistance (as has the United States). The Qataris and Turks are also Israel’s regional rivals. The Saudis are standing on principle, arguing that they oppose the breakup of any Arab state—Somalia is a member of the Arab League, though not ethnically Arab—and wondering about the slippery slope to the partition of other states, including Libya and Syria.
OK, sure, but Somaliland has been independent in all but name for 35 years. The Saudis, who are gripped in a spat with the United Arab Emirates that is linked in several ways to Israel, are having a hard time seeing the forest from the trees in Somaliland and understanding how Hargeisa’s independence could be a win for Riyadh in the same way that it serves U.S. interests.
Finally, there is Syria. Despite Arab nationalist lore, Syrian society is multiethnic and multireligious. After Bashar al-Assad fell in December 2024, the potential for Syria’s fragmentation seemed significant. There was ethnic violence in the Alawite coastal region in March 2025 and a massacre of Druze during the summer, precipitating an Israeli intervention. All the while, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were holding out, expecting the new order in Damascus under Sharaa—a former jihadi and Turkish ally—to fail.
It has not, and in response to SDF leader Gen. Mazloum Abdi’s apparent unwillingness to negotiate seriously with the central government, Sharaa undermined the group through a combination of force and guile. It is hard not to be sympathetic to the SDF, which fought alongside the United States against the Islamic State when NATO ally Turkey and others refused. But Team Trump was not wrong to back Syrian unity. Again, looking at the region from the cold calculation of U.S. interests in energy supplies, Israeli security, American primacy, and stability, Kurdish autonomy in Syria does not make sense.
The sanctity of state borders requires significant study. There is something to be said for preventing chaos, but I wonder how much of the opposition to South Yemen and Somaliland’s independence is little more than catastrophizing and lack of imagination. After all, there were once two Yemens, and Somaliland is already functionally independent. Both countries would make it easier and relatively less expensive for the United States to achieve its goals in the Middle East and Horn of Africa.
It is not the same with an independent Kurdistan. No doubt, many Kurds of Syria want to maintain their partnership with the United States, and their country would be a responsible member of the international community, but as important as those attributes may be, they do not compare in the cold calculation of U.S. interests. That’s why what has happened in Syria to the SDF seemed inevitable.
So, my preliminary answer to my own question about whether borders are still sacrosanct in a new era of international politics? Sometimes they are, but not always.
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